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Summary 
Although Raoul van Caenegem claimed otherwise, he had very strong views on what legal history 
should be. In his opinion, legal history belonged to the disciplinary field of history, not to law. The 
legal historian shouldnot only chronicle past evolutions of the law, but also explain them. To this 
purpose, van Caenegem himself turned to sociology, trying to work with types and models in order to 
generalise. Van Caenegem rejected the idea of a Volksgeist and advocated to look atthe European 
context in a comparative legal history. Nevertheless,his ‘Europe’ was limited to the founding 
members of the European Union, joined by England. He constructed legal history as a history of 
power and preferred to study groups of law makers instead of individuals. In legal history, the 
European ‘Second Middle Ages’, from 1100 until 1750, stand out as the cradle of the modern rule of 
law, with a special role for the cities of medieval Flanders. Although well-known for a leading 
handbook promoting the idea of the ius commune, the common law of Europe, van Caenegem 
actually deemed custom to have been the primary source of law in medieval Europe, whereas the 
role of the ius commune had been, in his opinion, overestimated. As he showed many times during 
his distinguished career, van Caenegem wanted legal historians to take part in current debates. In the 
end, his main lesson from legal history was a plea for moderation, as taking a sound idea to its 
extreme leads to absurd or unintended consequences. 
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“When asked about my philosophy, I answer that I do not have one.”1 This somewhat 
disingenuous statement by Raoul van Caenegem2 gives the impression that he did not harbour 
strong views on the legal historian’s craft. Van Caenegem merely offered glimpses of his 
theoretical attitude to legal history, as that would have run counter to his disclaimer that he 
did not have a ‘philosophy’. As this text hopes to show, he had a body of opinions on legal 
history that remain valuable today and can serve as a model or at least a source of inspiration 
for other legal historians. Needless to say, van Caenegem’s views need to be seen in the 
context of his time3 and should be judged from that perspective. With his statement on his 
                                                          
  
1  R.C. van Caenegem, How I came to write my books, Juridiska foreningens i Finland 
tidskrift (2015), p. 317. 
2 On van Caenegem, see D. Heirbaut, The life and work of Raoul Charles van 
Caenegem (1927-2018), Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis, 87 (2019), pp. 309-350 with the 
following corrigendum: the article neglected to mention two of his PhD students: Albert 
Derolez and Griet Maréchal (with my thanks to Prof. Dr. Marc Boone who kindly pointed this 
out to me).  
3  Cf. R.C. van Caenegem, Henri Pirenne: medievalist and historian of Belgium, in: Law, 
history, the Low Countries and Europe, ed. L. Milis, D. Lambrecht, H. De Ridder-Symoens and 
M. Vleeschouwers-Van Melkebeek, London-Rio Grande 1993, p. 162. (This text was first 
published in Dutch. Taking into account that more readers will know English, the references in 
philosophy, he wanted most of all to distinguish himself from Marxist historians.4 What he 
did not realise or wanted to realise was that by rejecting one side, he joined another. 
 
1.  Legal history belongs to history, not to law 
  
Although he started studying atGhent University to get a law degree, Raoul van Caenegem 
very soon also took on the study of history. Looking back on his career, he left no doubt that 
he saw himself first and foremost as a historian. In his ‘Legal historians I have known’, he 
calls several scholars his heroes. Most of them share a common trait: they moved from law to 
history. T.F.T. Plucknett did not really fit the mould because he had already started out as 
lawyer, but the real exception was Helmut Coing, who “remained a fully-fledged lawyer”.5  
 As for van Caenegem, legal history was history, it is necessary to start with his views 
on history. The key person to understand van Caenegem is his master François Louis 
Ganshof, the man who had seduced, if one may say so, van Caenegem into taking up legal 
history. Despite van Caenegem’s great admiration for Ganshof, his career was the antithesis 
of  Ganshof’s. Whereas Ganshof after some time shied away from generalisations, the 
sweeping all-encompassing synthesis became van Caenegem’s hallmark. Ganshof practiced a 
very positivistic historiography.6 In his memories of Ganshof, van Caenegem always refers to 
one incident: a lecture by Jean-François Lemarignier in Paris. The speaker introduced a 
hypothesis,which Ganshof ardently rebutted: “There is no text.” Any argument Lemarignier 
made thereafter continued to be shattered by Ganshof’s insistence on a text. 
Van Caenegem however did not want to belong to the group of historians who just 
collect all the facts that can beverified exactly in the sources. Hence, he criticised the work of 
the Société Jean Bodin. Its conferences reported faithfully on the evolution of a certain legal 
rule or principle in a wide-ranging variety of countries, but failed to go beyond a mere 
overview of all this material.7 Such an activity was not attractive to van Caenegem. He 
preferred to present a less than perfect answer to an interesting question rather than a very 
detailed answer to an irrelevant question.8 After all, if the historian can only speak out about  
those elements of the past on which he has a secure knowledge, then a lot will have to remain 
unsaid.9 Nevertheless, van Caenegem’s work falls in two categories. On the one hand there 
are the great generalisations which indeed strive to answer big questions, but on the other he 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
the footnotes of this article, where possible, refer to the English version. Readers who prefer the 
Dutch version of the publications mentioned, can do so by  perusing the bibliography published 
as an Annex to the article mentioned in note 2. Addendum to that bibliography A161: The 
English common law, a divergence from the European pattern, Tijdschrift voor 
Rechtsgeschiedenis, 47 (1979), pp. 1-7. 
4 Cf. van Caenegem (note 1), p. 317. 
5  R.C. van Caenegem, Legal historians I have known: a personal memoir, in: 
Rechtsgeschichte. Zeitschrift des Max-Planck-Instituts für europäische Rechtsgeschichte, 17 
(2010), p. 255. 
 6  Cf. R.C. van Caenegem, F.L. Ganshof: persoonlijke herinneringen, Tijdschrift 
voor geschiedenis, 119 (2006), pp. 517-519. 
7 R.C. van Caenegem, History and experiment, ed. L. Milis, D. Lambrecht, H. De Ridder-
Symoens and M. Vleeschouwers-Van Melkebeek, London-Rio Grande 1993, p. 13 note 3.  
8   R.C. van Caenegem, De bronnen voor de staatsrechtsgeschiedenis: enkele 
overwegingen, Verslagen en mededelingen van de Stichting tot uitgaaf der bronnen van het oud-
vaderlandse recht. Mededelingen, nieuwe reeks, 2 (1980), p. 69. 
9  Skriptinterview. Raoul G. (sic) van Caenegem, ed. H. Bas, F. Salomons, L. Schöduve and 
K. Van Lierop, Skript. Historisch Tijdschrift, 5 (1983/1), p. 16. 
also made detailed studies of law during the central Middle Ages. The latter era stands at a 
crossroads: the legal historian has disposal of plenty of sources to come to well-documented 
statements, but they are not so numerous that it is impossible to browse through everything. In 
his detailed studies van Caenegem went very far. He also consulted  archives10 and narrative 
sources,11  
Thus, the real distinction between van Caenegem and the “collectors of facts” was not 
in how completely the sources were consulted, but rather in the willingness to go beyond 
them. For van Caenegem the facts counted less than the ‘factors’generating them, i.e. their 
causes Law had not just divinely fallen from the sky.12 Students could not make him happier 
than by declaring that they did not only want to know what had happened, but also why it had 
happened.13 In his books, two types occur: books with the chronological succession of events 
and books that try to look at the factors behind these evolutions and transformations. Thus, the 
Historical introduction to private law14 and the Historical introduction to Western 
constitutional law15 have as counterparts Judges, legislators and professors16 and European 
law in the past and the future.17 Even in the chronological books these factors are not wholly 
absent, as in both a chapter deals with the underlying factors and themes. Looking for the 
factors of evolution implied what we could call a contextual legal history, the impact of 
society on legal evolutions. Van Caenegem’s praise for Wieacker’s Privatrechtsgeschichte 
der Neuzeit18 shows  what he expected fromlegal history: “insight into the meaning of past 
events” and “the law in a broad cultural context”.19 Nevertheless, the latter should not be 
exaggerated. Van Caenegem’s context limits itself mostly to the makers of the law: the 
judges, legislators, professors and others. Moreover, the relationship between law and society 
means that even with these limitations legal history can lead to valuable insights into the 
power relations of a past society.20 
  
2. The legal historian as a ‘sociologist’ 
 
                                                          
10  Cf. R.C. van Caenegem, Le jugement sous l’angle historico-comparatif, Archives de 
philosophie du droit, 39 (1995), p. 125.  
11 R.C. van Caenegem, Public prosecution of crime in twelfth-century England, in: Legal 
history: a European perspective, London-Rio Grande 1991, p. 11; van Caenegem, English 
lawsuits from William I to Richard I, London 1990-1991 (Selden society publications, 106), viii. 
12  Cf. van Caenegem (note 5), pp. 296-297 
13  R.C. van Caenegem, European law in the past and the future. Unity and diversity over 
two millennia, Cambridge 2002, p. 73 note 1. 
14  R.C. van Caenegem, An historical introduction to private law, Cambridge  1992. 
15 R.C. van Caenegem, An historical introduction to Western constitutional law, 
Cambridge 1995. 
16  R.C. van Caenegem, Judges, legislators and professors. Chapters in European legal 
history, Cambridge 1987. 
17  Van Caenegem (note 13). 
18  F. Wieacker, Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit, first edition  Göttingen 1952 
(English translation by T. Weir, A history of private law in Europe, Oxford 1995).  
19  van Caenegem (note 5), p. 293. 
20 R.C. van Caenegem, La Peine. Exposé introductif, in: Recueils de la société Jean Bodin, 
55, La Peine, 1, Brussels 1991, pp. 15-16; R.C. van Caenegem,  Criminal law in England and 
Flanders under King Henry II and Count Philip of Alsace, in: Diritto e potere nella storia 
Europea. Atti in onore di Bruno Paradisi. Quarto Congresso Internazionale della Società Italiana 
di storia del diritto, Florence, 1982, 1, pp. 248. 
Van Caenegem wanted to go beyond explanations of single events and for that he 
turned to sociology, most of all to Max Weber. He never took a class on sociology, but as a 
student he became a frequent guest of Ghent law school’s small library on sociology. The 
appraisal of sociology became a bone of contention between Ganshof and van Caenegem. To 
Ganshof, sociology was a siren that could only lead good historians astray.21 Van Caenegem, 
on the other hand, looked for patterns22 and pleaded for developing Weberian typologies.23 As 
such, he pitted chroniclers of facts against system builders and model makers..24 Once again, 
this should not be exaggerated. In van Caenegem’s work, the sociological element merely 
amounts to making generalisations illustrated by some well-chosen examples.25 Van 
Caenegem’s sociology did not entail any quantitative analysis, though he pleaded for maps 
visualising the chronological dispersion of for example freedom charters.26 
 Van Caenegem may have loved sociology and went a far way into the direction of a 
more sociological legal history, but he did not go all the way. His Historical introduction to 
Western constitutional law kicks off with an attempt at defining public law Elsewhere, for 
example when writing on European civilisation, he refuses to provide a definition, as most of 
his readers will know what it is about anyway.27 It is hard to imagine a sociologist agreeing to 
such legerdemain. Moreover, van Caenegem does not at all believe in monocausal 
explanations.28  There is always a variety of causes at play.29 In fact, in his opinion, the true 
historian distinguishes himself from a retrospective practitioner of another discipline by his 
willingness to look into not just the one element that interests him, but by considering all 
relevant elements. Thus, whereas a retrospective jurist only wants to trace back a legal rule in 
time, the legal historian pays attention to a variety of factors.30 Given the complexity of past 
societies, the typologies and models of sociology only have a limited value. They are useful 
abstractions, but they cannot constrain the realities of the past31 and factors may lead to a 
certain outcome, but not necessarily so,32 exactly because there are too many of them 
interfering with one another.33 
 Van Caenegem was a child of both Ganshof’s strict adherence to facts and Weber’s 
models. The former had taught him to respect the variety of the past, the latter to reduce it to 
                                                          
21  van Caenegem (note 6), p. 517. 
22 R.C. van Caenegem, Over koningen en bureaucraten. Oorsprong en ontwikkeling van de 
hedendaagse staatsinstellingen, Amsterdam 1977, p. 153. 
23 R.C. van Caenegem, Le problème des chartes de libertés, in: Album Elemer Malyusz, 
Brussels, Librairie encyclopédique, 1976, p. 14. 
24 Cf. van Caenegem (note 5), p. 269 
25  van Caenegem (note 22), p. 153; cf. R.C. van Caenegem, Max Weber: historian and 
sociologist, in: Legal history: a European perspective, London-Rio Grande 1991, pp. 212-220. 
26 van Caenegem (note 23), p. 15. 
27  R.C. van Caenegem, Historical reflections on European syncretism, Sartoniana, 7 
(1994), pp. 245-260. 
28 R.C. van Caenegem, Willem de Zwijger en de opstand der Nederlanden: een proeve van 
plaatsbepaling, in: Herdenking Willem van Oranje 1584-1984, Brussel Paleis der Academiën 12 
oktober 1984, Brussels, 1985, p. 44. 
29 van Caenegem (note 22), p. 172. 
30  R.C. van Caenegem, Clio and the humanities: Alma Mater and prodigal sons, in: Law, 
history, the Low Countries and Europe, ed.L. Milis, D. Lambrecht, H. De Ridder-Symoens and 
M. Vleeschouwers-Van Melkebeek, London-Rio Grande 1994, p. 30. 
31  Van Caenegem (note 25), p. 212. 
32  R.C. van Caenegem, Engeland, wonderland, Leuven 2005, p. 23. 
33  Van Caenegem (note 28), p. 44. 
types, but these two irreconcilable approaches clashed. Van Caenegem’s way out of this 
dilemma was calling in ‘chance’, as if it were a deus ex machina. Chance crops up as an 
explanation, wherever the generalisations he develops fit well with certain situations, but not 
with others. As an explanation chance leaves much to be desired. It left van Caenegem free to 
generalise and to sweep discrepancies under the rug as the product of chance. Nowadays, a 
better way to cope with this would be process tracing, as political scientists and in their wake 
historians, have developed and applied this method. Process tracing delves deeper than factors 
and outcomes, but looks at the mechanisms of the evolution in between. Thus, it can help 
identify intervening factors.34 If van Caenegem could have applied this method, he would 
have noticed that many events he ascribed to chance were actually the result of an intervening 
factor. However, process tracing would have meant a painstakingly detailed research of the 
sources which would have made it impossible for van Caenegem to write so many books. 
 As he was aware of the weaknesses of his reliance on chance, van Caenegem turned to 
counterfactual history. Whereas he still showed some reservations towards it in 1973,35 he 
later became an enthusiastic convert, mostly thanks to Niall Ferguson’s The pity of war,36 
which explored several counterfactual scenario’s concerning World War I.37 The newest 
generation of historians in Belgium may have embraced counterfactual history,38 but older 
generations did not understand how a serious scholar like van Caenegem could be fascinated 
by it. However, counterfactual history helped van Caenegem to further develop the element of 
chance. Unlike other scientists, historians cannot experiment, but they can make comparisons 
with another situation in the past, where one element is either absent of additionally present.39 
Developing a likely outcome of events based on such a well-chosen comparisons more than a 
game, as it helps to show the importance of what did happen40 and makes clear that if certain 
groups had acted differently another history could have been possible.41 English history, or 
rather English legal history, turned out to be particularly interesting in this regard.  
 Amongst the many factors that played a role in legal evolution, the national spirit is 
not one van Caenegem accepted. For example, he saw no sign of a particular English national 
spirit, a Volksgeist in Savigny’s terminology, that inevitably had resulted in the English 
common law, distinct from the ius commune, the common law of Europe.42 In general, 
England did not evolve differently from other European countries, although its law did not 
follow the European pattern.43 Timing played a crucial role. England had become a strong 
                                                          
34  D. Beach, Process-tracing methods in social science, in: Oxford research encyclopedia 
of politics: qualitative political methodology, ed. W. Thompson, Oxford 2017 
(http://politics.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-
9780190228637-e-176, consulted on 1 April 2020); A. Verfaillie, Breaker of chains, diplomat 
of change? Amnesty international’s advocacy for human rights at the United Nations (1961-
mid-80s), Ghent 2020 (unpublished PhD thesis Ghent university), pp. 26-27. 
35 Van Caenegem (note 7), p. 13.  
36 N. Ferguson, The pity of war, New York, 1999. 
37 R.C. van Caenegem, Counterfactual History and the First World War, European 
Review, 25 (2017), pp. 494-501. 
38  M. Van Ginderachter, K. Aerts and A. Vrints (ed.), Het land dat nooit was. Een 
tegenfeitelijke geschiedenis van België, Amsterdam 2014. 
39  Van Caenegem (note 7), pp. 6-7. 
40 Van Caenegem (note 32), p. 129. 
41 Van Caenegem (note 36), p. 495. 
42  Van Caenegem (note 16), p. 71. 
43  Van Caenegem (note 32), p. 67; R.C. van Caenegem, The English common law, a 
divergence from the European pattern, Tijdschrift voor rechtsgeschiedenis, 47 (1979), p. 2. 
centralised state earlier than other European countries44 and when it modernised its law, the 
ius commune did not yet present a readymade package. Hence, England developed its own 
system.45 If not for that, its law would not have diverged from the common European pattern. 
Moreover, England’s indigenous development of its common law used general European 
elements.46 Thus, England’s divergent evolution presents an interesting case. It shows what 
European law could have become without a dominant ius commune.47 Even if England went 
its own way, it continued a European pattern. Thus even English legal history confirms the 
following statement: “European history, which is fundamentally a whole, but extremely 
varied in detail.”48 
 
3. Comparative European legal history 
 
 In line with his rejection of a predestination of nations, van Caenegem advocated for a 
distinctly European view on legal history. Even his studies of Flemish or English law49 do not 
disregard the European context. His Introduction to private law, targeted at readers from 
France and the Low Countries, does not ignore the broader European background, since to 
van Caenegem the national era of law was only a recent phenomenon that would not last.50 
This explains why the Introduction despite its Franco-Belgian point of view contains plenty to 
attract other readers. Van Caenegem’s first book in Dutch on the history of England also 
belongs in this category. Although van Caenegem claimed to have written it at the request of 
the students of English in Ghent who had no book on English history in their own language,51 
he also used the occasion to write down his view of English history. Neither England, nor its 
law developed in isolation from the continent.52 Interestingly, van Caenegem was not really 
impressed by English law. In his Engeland, wonderland,53 the last great monograph he wrote, 
he asks and answers the questionwhich legal system he deems superior: common law or civil 
law. Due to the lack of a theoretical framework and clear concepts, he prefers the latter over 
the former.54 As the book was published in Dutch, his English friends could not take notice 
and, thus, had no reason to complain.  
 Van Caenegem’s Europe is very much Europe as his generation in Belgium saw it: 
Belgium and the neighbouring countries. At the start of his career as a tenured scientist, he 
witnessed the birth of the European Communities. As such, van Caenegem’s Europe is very 
much like the European communities in their infancy. France and Germany take center stage, 
and as the countries in between them, van Caenegem paid due attention to Belgium, 
Luxemburg and the Netherlands, but also Italy. Although England only joined this group in 
                                                          
44  Van Caenegem (note 43), p. 6. 
45  R.C. van Caenegem, The Birth of the English common law, Cambridge, 1973, pp. x-xi. 
46  R.C. van Caenegem Public prosecution of crime in twelfth-century England, in: Legal 
history: a European perspective, London-Rio Grande 1991, p. 11. 
47  Van Caenegem (note 13), p. 84. 
48  R.C. van Caenegem, Methods of proof in Western medieval law,  in: Legal history: a 
European perspective, London-Rio Grande, Hambledon press 1991, pp. 71-113. 
49  E.g. van Caenegem (note 11), p. xvi. 
50  Cf. also van Caenegem (note 13), p. 1. 
51  Rechtshistorici uit de Lage Landen: interview met R.C. Van Caenegem, ed. S. Faber and 
D. Heirbaut, Pro Memorie, 1 (1999), p. 10. 
52  R.C. van Caenegem, Geschiedenis van Engeland. Van Stonehenge tot het tijdperk der 
vakbonden, The Hague - Antwerp 2003, p. 9. 
53 Van Caenegem (note 32). 
54  Van Caenegem (note 32), 82. 
1973, van Caenegem included it from the start, but that was only due to his own personal 
interests. To van Caenegem,nything beyond the original European six and England did not 
really count. Spain was, at best, only mentioned in passing. In the Introduction to private law 
the school of Salamanca is remarkable for its absence.55 Beyond Germany, a vacuum seems to 
exist. Northern, Central and Eastern Europewere not worthy of much attention. American law 
schools, albeit they dominated the twentieth century and influenced van Caenegem himself56, 
do not appear in the book. In the Introduction to Western constitutional law the United States 
appear, but mostly because its constitution was an offshoot of European ideas, influencing 
Europe in turnEurope,57 which in fact meant only the Western European countries van 
Caenegem was really interested in. The Soviet Union was another exception, but for an author 
with a professional career during the Cold War era, it would have been hard to ignore this 
challenger to the ideals for which, in his opinion, Western Europe stood.58 If Caenegem had 
belonged to the current generation, there is no doubt that he would also have  looked at Islam, 
as he did in one article at the end of his life.59 In van Caenegem’s Western Europe, Italy is 
somewhat of an outsider. Describing the medieval ius commune, he could not ignore Italy,, 
but its contribution ends with Andrea Alciato in the first half of the sixteenth century.60 
Moreover, Italy amounts to Northern Italy. The kingdom of Sicily is only mentioned once in 
the private law book61 and not at all in the constitutional law book, even though its importance 
for the development of the modern state is undeniable. 
Van Caenegem’s European gaze was inextricably linked to a comparative perspective. 
In his opinion, even duller branches of law, like civil procedure, became interesting when 
studied comparatively.62 Legal transplants, an important topic for comparative lawyers, were 
far from an issue to van Caenegem, as history contained many examples of legal transplants 
that did not disrupt a nation’s life.63 His own Belgium served as the best example. The French 
annexation in 1795 meant twenty years of foreign rule,  sweeping away the old indigenous 
law and replaing it with French law. As already indicated, to van Caenegem comparative legal 
history, meant more than just descriptions of the different legal systems, what Germans would 
call Auslandskunde. Of the latter he already had an example in Le droit privé des peuples by 
René Dekkers,64 who had been of his teachers in Ghent. By his search for underlying 
mechanisms, van Caenegem went into the other direction. 
                                                          
55  Compare this with the recent publication of a research guide for studying this part of 
legal history: W. Decock and C. Birr, Recht und Moral der Scholastik der Frühen Neuzeit 
1500-1750, Oldenbourg, 2016.  
56 See below. 
57  Van Caenegem (note 15), p. 151. 
58  Cf. van Caenegem (note 15), p. 249. 
59 R.C. van Caenegem, Historical reflections on Islam and the Occident, European 
Review, 20 (2012), pp. 203-209. 
60  Van Caenegem (note 14), pp. 56-57. 
61 Van Caenegem (note 14), p. 88. 
62  R.C. van Caenegem, Gentse Professoren in de Rechten en de Letteren - 1946-1992, 
Gendtsche Tydinghen, 44 (2015), p. 251. 
63  R.C. van Caenegem Considérations historiques sur l’unification du droit européen, in: 
Actes des Journéesinternationales de Toulouse de la Société d’histoire du droit, Juin 2005, 
Toulouse 2006, pp. 493-494. On Dekkers, see D. Heirbaut, René Dekkers (1909-1976): een 
duizendpoot van het recht, in: Tweehonderd jaar rechtsfaculteiten Gent en Luik/Deux-centième 
anniversaire des facultés de droit de Gand, ed. D. Heirbaut, P. Wautelet, P. Humblet, J.-F. Gerkens, G. 
Grandjean and M. Cools (ed.), Bruges 2019, 149-154. 
64 R. Dekkers, Le droit privé des peuples, Brussels 1953. 
 3. Law is (not only) power 
 
 A title like ‘Law and power’65 indicates that to van Caenegem, law reflected the 
outcome of political struggles: a Kampf ums Recht in von Jhering’s words or the ‘law is 
politics’ of American scholars.66 Thus, inn his opinion, legal history belongs to political 
history.67 Whereas others constructed legal history as a history of ideas, for van Caenegem it 
was about power.68 Yet, he did not deny the role of ideas. Political actors need arguments and 
intellectuals deliver  the necessary ammunition. However,  ideas cannot thrive without the 
political will to turn them into reality.69 Ultimately, this amounts to “Law scholars serve the 
power that be.”70 In short, the law scholar has a legitimizing/supporting role, but it should not 
be exaggerated. More generally, whether judges, legislators or professors, eachof these law 
makers represents powerful social groups,steering legal development.71 Remarkably, in his 
book on kings and bureaucrats from 1977, a book never translated from Dutch, van Caenegem 
mentions a fourth group,72 the bureaucrats, but in his later work the latter are absent.  
 The individual legislator, judge or professor only represents larger groups. Their 
specific contribution is just a small stone of the bigger mosaic. Although van Caenegem 
admitted that individuals could make a difference,73 he preferred not to study them. To him, 
they were just ‘bricks in the wall’. Some of the changes he attributed to chance may actually 
be better understood if seen as the product of individual choice. Nevertheless, two persons 
stand out, because they dominated his licentiate’s, PhD and habilitation thesis: the Flemish 
Count Philip of Alsace and the English King Henry II. Van Caenegem’s first two books on 
criminal law and criminal procedure in Flanders from the eleventh to the fourteenth century 
had in common that a fundamental modernisation occurred in twelfth century Flanders under 
Philip of Alsace. Philip, in his opinion the greatest of Flanders’ counts,74 starred in many of 
van Caenegem’s publications. He even bestowed the name ‘Grand charter’ (Grote keure) on 
                                                          
65  R.C. van Caenegem, Law and power in twelfth-century Flanders, in: Cultures of power. 
Lordship, status, and process in twelfth-century Europe, ed. T. Bisson, Philadelphia 1995, pp. 
149-171. 
66 R.C. van Caenegem, De ‘heren van het recht’: rechters, politici en geleerden, in: 
Historisch vooruitzicht. Opstellen over rechtsgeschiedenis en burgerlijk recht. BW-krant, 
Jaarboek 1994, ed. M. Franke, J. Smits and W. Valk, Arnhem 1994, p. 66; R.C. van Caenegem 
Galbert of Bruges and “Law is politics”, in: Inter Amicos. Liber amicorum Monique Van 
Melkebeek, ed. M. Decaluwé, V. Lambert and D. Heirbaut, Brussels, 2011, pp. 19-32; van 
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the criminal charters Philip imposed on the great Flemish cities,75 thereby elevating Philip 
himself to a higher level of importance. Philip of Alsace had interacted with all the great 
princes of his time76 and of them Henry II of England drew van Caenegem’s attention, 
because Henry’s reforms ran parallel to Philip’s.77   
 
4. The Middle Ages as the cradle of modernity 
 
 Ghent University is located in the old county of Flanders, a region which knew its 
heyday during the central and late Middle Ages. Hence, in the twentieth century, the great 
historians of Flanders focused in the Middle Ages. This tendency manifested itself even more 
strongly in legal history. Until the end of the twentieth century legal history by definition was 
medieval history. Van Caenegem fit that mould perfectly, but unlike his colleagues, he also 
explained why the Middle Ages for him was history’s crucial era. When he became a full 
professor, Ghent University had no tradition of inaugural lectures. Van Caenegem held one, 
no doubt hoping, in vain, to start a tradition. His lecture unveils a fundamental part of van 
Caenegem’s program: the place of the Western Middle Ages in world history.78 In van 
Caenegem’s opinion, today’s world has to thank the Middle Ages for two great gifts: modern 
science and the rule of law.79 In his further career he only worked on the latter, though for a 
long time he harboured the hope that at the end of his career he would also write a big book 
on the contribution of the Middle Ages to the rise of the modern scientific mind.80 Rule of law 
or rather Rechtsstaat lies at the heart of many of his publications.81 These terms are just 
shorthand for the Western-style democracy in which the citizens vote for members of 
parliament and the powers of the state are limited by constitutions. Van Caenegem developed 
his own line of evolution which debuts with the medieval church and feudalism. The 
importance of the church and its papal revolution on the road to the modern state has become 
well-known thanks to the two volumes of Harold Berman’s Law and revolution.82 The 
English and American reader may know only van Caenegem’s Historical introduction to 
Western constitutional law, which even in its original Dutch version appeared five years after 
Berman’s first volume. However, van Caenegem had already published another book on the 
history of public law, Koningen en bureaucraten (Kings and bureaucrats). In this 1977 book 
van Caenegem already develops the idea of the medieval church as a model emulated by 
secular states. Van Caenegem did not continue with this book, which readers of Dutch 
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consider to be a masterpiece,83 and replaced it with the Historical introduction to Western 
constitutional law,84 a good book, unless the reader has first fallen in love with Koningen en 
bureaucraten.  
 For van Caenegem,feudalism furthermore played a crucial role.85 To Marxists, it may 
seem anathema to see feudalism, in which rich landlords oppress poor peasants, as a 
champion of freedom, but van Caenegem’s feudalism was Ganshofian feudalism, based on a 
contract between two free persons, the lord and the man, with the man offering his services, 
but the lord also giving something in return, protection and the vassal’s upkeep, the latter 
mostly by the grant of a fief.86 For van Caenegem, feudalism transformed the relation between 
the ruler and the ruled. Originally, subjects only had duties, but as vassals they had a contract 
with their prince which also awarded them rights. Hence, the vassal was the missing link 
between the subject, with only duties, and the citizen, with duties and rights.87 
 Van Caenegem’s Middle Ages started around 1100, when the church awoke from its 
slumber and started to reform, in turn inspiring the rest of European society. Thus, the twelfth 
century forms a watershed and the Middle Ages actually consist of two eras, the Early Middle 
Ages and the era from 1100 until 1750. Although he uses this distinction in his Introduction 
to private law, its main justification can be found in his concise history of the Middle Ages in 
Dutch.88 Van Caenegem’s view of the Early Middle Ages needs some clarification. Generally, 
he saw the evolution of law and institutions as going towards a more rational,89 i.e. law based 
society,90 though as usual for him, not as the consequence of grand design, but rather due to a 
lot of chance.91 The Early Middle Ages was still firmly rooted in an irrational mentality, as 
was evident from its methods of proof.92 Van Caenegem had to defend himself against the 
accusation that by labelling early methods of proof irrational, he had called medieval people 
backwards. Therefore, he clarified his views.93 The word ‘irrational’ to him did not imply a 
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value judgment, but only wanted to convey the idea that early medieval man did not use 
rational human reasoning, but instead relied on outside divine intervention.94  
 Van Caenegem’s second Middle Ages, from 1100 until 1750 are, of course, European 
Middle Ages. The rule of law with all it implies is, in his opinion, a European achievement95 
and he considers European history to be, in this, an anomaly in world history.96 This could 
easily have led to a very Eurocentric view, but van Caenegem also makes clear that this 
unique European position does not result from any divine providence or special quality of 
Europe. The singular European case is merely an accident of history.97 Within Europe, this 
time the Low Countries occupy a special place. Van Caenegem does not think highly of his 
own region’s contribution to the development of law. Apart from the “towering figure of 
Grotius”,98 there are no great judges, legislators or professors.99  This sounds very strange 
coming from a man who constantly met Dutch legal historians and cannot have failed to 
notice that the Dutch fame as a European leading nation of law was based on more than just 
Grotius. For van Caenegem, the Low Countries meant the Southern Low Countries, today’s 
Belgium and within that area only one region really counted: Flanders. There the first “seeds 
of modern democracy” took root.100 True, the county of Flanders had no document of freedom 
and liberty like Magna Carta, but only because the power of its great cities meant that the 
Rechtsstaat was realised at the local level, with charters for the individual cities.101 Hence, his 
interest in the 1127 Saint-Omer borough charter and in Galbert of Bruges’ 1127-1128 diary 
which chronicled how the citizens of Bruges and Ghent had realised the first great experiment 
in medieval democracy.102 As a legal historian from the old county of Flanders, van 
Caenegem did not devote much attention to the great series of general freedom charters for 
the old county of Brabant103 and he only glosses over the contribution of Spain,104 a pioneer of 
medieval parliamentarism and constitutionalism. Yet, he added a twist to the typical evolution 
of modern parliaments and constitutions as seen by Anglo-Americans. Their teleology goes 
from Magna Carta to the American constitution. Van Caenegem adds a second source of 
inspiration for the United States: the Dutch republic, or, by another name which makes the 
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link even more evident: the United Provinces.105 However, for van Caenegem, the Dutch 
provinces mainly form the bridge between medieval Flanders and later events. After all, the 
Dutch republic was only a successor of the Burgundian-Habsburg Low Countries of which 
Flanders had been the shining jewel on the crown.106  
 
5. Custom: the real life of the law 
 
 The end of the twentieth century witnessed a new instrumentalisation of legal history. 
Proponents of a new common law for Europe found their justification in history. After all, if 
Europe had one common law in the past, the ius commune, consisting of Roman and canon 
law, it becomes difficult to oppose the creation of a new common law for Europe. Van 
Caenegem’s books provided ideal ammunition for the new ius commune, as they described in 
several languages the love affair between Roman and canon law on the one hand and 
European society on the other hand, during the 1100-1750 era. Even more than Koschaker 
and Wieacker, van Caenegem may have helped to promote the idea of the old ius commune. 
He also wrote a book107 and articles on Roman and canon law in the Southern Low 
Countries.108 However, looking at those publications van Caenegem is not at all a defender of 
the common law of Europe. Instead, he emphasizes how small the impact of the learned law 
was in the Middle Ages.109 In his opinion, the specialists of the learned law overestimated its 
importance. 110 It did not help here that van Caenegem’s attitude towards his own books was 
‘Walk and don’t look back’. Rewriting a book was not in his character. Hence, his valuable 
warning on the importance of the ius commune never made it into his own handbook on the 
history of private law. Moreover, his main article downplaying the role of the learned law111 
only appeared in Dutch, so that his international readership inevitably failed to notice it. 
 To van Caenegem the principal source of law in medieval Europe had been custom. 
Local customs, not the learned law of Europe, determined the life of ordinary people.112  In 
his view, there is no doubt that currently the role of the ius commune is overestimated. Why 
should a young aspiring law scholar work on local law? That only leads to attention from a 
local public. The ius commune on the other hand implies international publications and a 
greater chance at fame and tenure. Van Caenegem’s own career also reflects this. As one may 
expect from a scholar who points out the importance of customs, he deemed local research to 
be important and presided for most of his life over the board of editors of the most important 
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local historical review in the province  of East Flanders113 and also supported its counterpart 
in neighbouring Western Flanders.114 However, he mainly addressed a European public with 
broader issues. Last but not least, van Caenegem’s outlook on the relationship between local 
customs and the learned law remained coloured by his own origins. Like Northern France, the 
regions of what would later become his native Belgium belonged to the pays de droit 
coutumier, the lands of customary law, i.e. those parts of Western Europe where, together 
with England, custom resisted the encroachment of the learned law the best.115 Thus, van 
Caenegem’s research on criminal law and criminal procedure in medieval Flanders unearthed 
no learned influence.116 Things might have been different had he worked on a later era or 
another region. In short, whereas he was right in warning against overestimating the 
importance of the ius commune, he extrapolated from his own research on Flanders, which 
may have led him to underestimate the role of the ius commune elsewhere. 
 
6.The legal historian and current debates 
 
 Van Caenegem worked in both the law and the arts faculties of Ghent University. In 
the law school a convivial atmosphere reigned, whereas the arts faculty felt more like a 
snakepit to van Caenegem.117 Although he considered himself to be a historian, van 
Caenegem could not escape the mentality of friends and colleagues from the world of law. To 
Ganshof a historian should merely describe past events and for the remainderstand above the 
fray.118 Van Caenegem, however, also took current concerns into account. Historia docet: the 
historian can draw valuable lessons from the past for his own time.119 By communicating the 
experience of the past, the historian can also contribute to current debates.120 If not, others 
will do so in his stead. They may even be colleagues from other human sciences. In that case, 
the danger is limited. Unlike a historian, these outsiders will not see the complete picture, as 
they have only selected what is relevant to them.121 At worst, legal historians themselves 
abuse legal history for political reasons.122 In that case, van Caenegem prefers to take a stand, 
to present his own value judgements.123 The historian can judge, for example, whether law has 
been liberating or oppressive.124  
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Here, van Caenegem encounters a problem. An evaluation needs a standard, and which 
standard should one use? In an article on ‘Old law, good law’, he pleads for evaluating an era 
and its laws by its own, contemporary, criteria.125 This clashes with his acceptance of 
anachronisms in other publications126 and his willingness to embrace different standards 
which may lead to different evaluations.127 Van Caenegem liked most of all to offer his 
opinion on the growing unification of law in Europe. He distinguished pessimists, who argue 
unification will never happen and optimists, who believe it will. He positioned himself in the 
latter camp, as he saw convergence of common law and civil law,128 but he wrote this, of 
course, before the Brexit. 
 
7. Conclusion: sound ideas, yes; absurd consequennces, no 
 
 Even before the British leave vote, van Caenegem still had his doubts and reservations 
on the future of England and Europe, which seems to characterize all of his scholarship. In 
order to understand this attitude, one should consult one of his last articles: Sound ideas and 
absurd consequences.129 It summarizes van Caenegem’s main lesson from history: humans, 
and in particular jurists of the past sometimes had very sound ideas. However, taking those 
ideas to the extreme inevitably leads to absurd or unintended consequences. A bit of prudence 
is always advised. If the legal historian takes only one lesson from van Caenegem’s rich and 
diverse work, it should be this one.  
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